Restrictions on the Use of Cooperative Apartment Property by Wallace, Arthur E.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 13 | Issue 3 Article 5
1-1962
Restrictions on the Use of Cooperative Apartment
Property
Arthur E. Wallace
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Arthur E. Wallace, Restrictions on the Use of Cooperative Apartment Property, 13 Hastings L.J. 357 (1962).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol13/iss3/5
COMMENTS
RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF
COOPERATIVE APARTMENT PROPERTY
By AR~niuu E. WALLAciE*
THE CONCENTRATION of our population in metropolitan areas,
resulting in a strong social and economic interdependence of our citi-
zens, has been the compelling factor for increased legislation and judi-
cial decision in the area of land use controls. In our early agrarian
society, little thought was given to what a nearest neighbor was doing
with his land or to whom he may have sold it. As the distance between
neighboring landowners shrank, these factors became increasingly
important until today, as evidenced by our complex zoning regulations,
the development of the principles of equitable servitudes and the in-
creasing sanction of restrictive covenants are of paramount importance.
A more recent development, parallel in principle to this horizontal
concentration, is the vertical concentration of our metropolitan popu-
lation into large multi-story apartment buildings. Ordinarily, to avail
oneself of the benefits of apartment living, a person was required to
give up the advantages of home ownership. This was the situation
which led to the development of the cooperative apartment plan.
This comment will examine the methods used by the apartment
community in controlling the use and occupation of the individual
apartment and its common facilities, the legal problems in their appli-
cation, and the need for special legislation and enlightened judicial
decision in this regard.
The Organization of the Cooperative Apartment
With some variation and combination the cooperative apartment
is organized under one of three basic forms.' The corporate form is by
far the most extensively used. The trust form is not commonly used.
The fee ownership form or condominium is at the present time a rar-
ity,2 but seems to be receiving the increased interest of real estate
developers and community planners.3
Member, Second Year class.
'For a complete discussion of the cooperative apartment scheme and the form under
which it exists, see: Note, Cooperative Apartment Housing, 61 HAnv. L. REV. 1407
(1948); Castle, Legal Phases of Cooperative Buildings, 2 So. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1928);
Yourman, Some Legal Aspects of Cooperative Housing, 12 LAw & CoNiwn,. PsoB. 126
(1947); Symposium-The How & Why of Real Estate Cooperatives, PnAc. LAw. Nov.
1959, p. 59. For forms: 8 AM. Jun. LEGAL FoAMs ANNoTATm §§ 8:374-81; 1A MoDEmN
LEGAL FoaMs §§ 2191-2209.
2 PowELL, REAL PNoPEnTY § 632 (1954).
3 Borgwardt, The Condomniium, 36 CAL.. S. Ba. J. 603 (1961).
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The corporate form utilizes two basic instruments: corporate stock
and long term leases. The legal title to the entire project is vested in
a non-profit corporation, 4 which operates and maintains the building
and facilities and provides for financing. The "tenant-owner"5 acquires
his interest through the purchase of corporate stock equal in amount
to the value of his apartment; and concomitant thereto takes a proprie-
tary lease6 on said apartment. The rent reserved under the lease is a
proportionate share of the expenses of operation and maintenance and
the discharge of the financial obligation on the project. The corpora-
tion is governed by a board of directors elected by, and comprised of,
tenant-owners.
The trust form is similar in function to the corporate form. Title
is vested in a trustee who issues to the tenant-owners certificates of
beneficial interest guaranteeing exclusive occupancy of a particular
apartment and use of the common facilities during compliance with
the terms of the trust, i.e., payment of a proportionate share of ex-
penses. In contrast to the corporate form, the management of the
property is controlled by the trustee. This factor, which diminishes
the degree of "ownership," is thought to be the reason for the lack of
popularity of this form.7
The condominium or fee ownership form differs radically from
either the trust or corporate forms. The tenant-owner, in this form, is
given legal title in fee to the air space constituting his apartment and
is made a tenant in common with the other tenant-owners in the re-
mainder of the project. Covenants in the deeds provide for the pay-
ment of a proportionate share of the maintenance costs and for the
appointment of a manager for the project. The tenant-owner also
covenants not to seek judicial partition of the common area during
the life of the project. Cross-easements of support and right of way
are provided for in the subdivision of the building.8
As can be seen, even from this very superficial study, the legal
relationships created by the formation of a cooperative apartment are
not readily classifiable into the standard niches used in our legal sys-
tem. Pachel, in his work on the law of cooperatives, stated, "There is
a growing tendency on the part of courts not to accept blindly existing
rules of law where the reasons for those rules have no applicability to
cooperatives."O The available decisions bear him out in this regard.' 0
4 CAL. CORP. CODE § 12201.
5 This name will be used throughout this note to describe the person holding an in-
terest in an apartment under the cooperative system regardless of the form.
6 Since the continuance of the lease is dependent on the lessee's holding of the req-
uisite number of shares, the term "proprietary lease" is used in this field.
7 4 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 632 (1954).
8 For an excellent analysis of this form see Borgwardt, The Condominium, 36 CAL.
S. BAR J. 603 (1961).
9 PACHEL, COOPERATrVES 49 (3rd ed. 1956).
10 In applying rent control laws the tenant-owner has been held to be the owner of
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13
Therefore, it is necessary, in analyzing the problems of the cooperative
apartment plan, to bear in mind that the courts have considerable lee-
way in applying the law in litigation involving the peculiar nature of
this scheme. Since the cooperative apartment plan is in accord with
sound public policy and fulfills a distinct social need, the decisions of
the courts should be geared to preserve the scheme, not destroy it.
Restraints on Alienation
In analyzing the cooperative apartment scheme, two important
reasons for control of the alienation of the interests created therein be-
come readily apparent. First, and most obvious, is the proximity of the
dwelling units and the substantial financial outlay involved. Unlike
individual housing, the apartment is denuded of the isolating protec-
tion of surrounding grounds. Also, the apartment dweller is required
to share the common facilities with his neighbors. In addition, the
tenant-owner, unlike the ordinary apartment dweller, has invested a
good deal of money in his home; often making it financially impossible
to move from unpleasant surroundings.
A second and somewhat more tangible reason for the control of
alienation rights is the financial interdependence of the tenant-owners.
Each tenant-owner is required to contribute his share of the operating
and maintenance costs as well as to the discharge of the financial obli-
gation on the cooperative property. The creditors of these obligations
have their claim against the group as a whole whether it be a corpora-
tion, trust or tenant in common. Therefore, if one tenant-owner fails
in his obligation, his share must be borne by the other tenant-owners.
Restrictions on Transfer of Corporate Stock
The general tenor of stock transfer restrictions in the cooperative
apartment scheme is that no transfer may be made without the express
consent of the board of directors or a substantial majority of the stock-
holders." These provisions may be found in the articles of incorpora-
his apartment: Kenny v. Tompson, 338 Ill. App. 403, 87 N.E.2d 229 (1949); Tudor Arms
Apartments v. Shaffer, 191 Md. 342, 62 A.2d 346 (1948); 542 Morris Park Ave. Corp. v.
Welkin, 120 Misc. 48, 197 N.Y. Supp. 625 (App. T. 1922). A California case, In re
Estate of Pitts, 218 Cal. 184, 22 P.2d 694 (1933) held that although the corporation held
the legal title, for all intents and purposes the entire equitable ownership was distributed
to the tenant-owners; therefore the "lessees" had an interest in real property. A landlord-
tenant relationship has been recognized between the corporation and the tenant-owners:
Mayer v. Chelton, 321 Pa. 209, 183 Atl. 773 (1936); Hicks v. Bigelow, 44 A.2d 924
(D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1947) where the court said, in effect, that there was a landlord-
tenant relationship between the corporation and the tenant-owner; but, in substance the
apartments were owner-occupied. Other decisions showing a willingness of the courts to
consider the peculiarities of the cooperative apartment plan will be discusssed as they
apply to the subject matter of this comment.
1:18 Am. Jun. LEGAL FoaMs ANNoTATED § 8.380 (Calif. Bylaws of Corporate Form
of Cooperative Apartment.)
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tion, 12 and are usually found in the bylaws. '1 3 It is required that
statements of such a restriction be placed on the stock certificate. 14
As a general rule corporate stock, being personal property, carries
with it the inherent right of free transferability at the will of the
holder.15 However, reasonable restraints have been held valid,' and
are expressly provided for in California by statute. 7
The problem then is to determine whether or not the restriction
outlined above is reasonable. Restrictions requiring consent of the
corporation have not yet been approved in California,", although those
giving the corporation a first option have.' 9 One California case, Oak-
land Scavengers Co. v. Gandi,20 approved a provision which provided
that on the death of the stockholder the corporation took the shares
as trustee and could, at their election, transfer the stock to his son or
sell the stock and distribute the proceeds to the deceased stockholder's
estate. Although the bylaw in this case was invalid on other grounds,
the court upheld the provision as a contract not against public policy.
The reasonableness of provisions restricting the transfer of corpo-
rate stock is said to depend on the necessity of the particular enterprise
in overruling the general public policy against restraints on aliena-
tion.2' The socio-economic reasons for such restrictions in the coopera-
tive apartment plan seem adequate to supply this element of necessity.
Cases in other jurisdictions have so held,2 2 and in the light of the Oak-
land Scavengers case it seems certain that California will follow suit.
Restrictions Prohibiting Assignment or Subletting
The proprietary lease in the cooperative apartment plan generally
contains a covenant by the tenant-owner to the effect that he will not
12 Thomsen v. Yankee Mariner Corp., 106 Cal. App. 2d 454, 235 P.2d 234 (1951);
CAL. CORP. CODE § 305(c).
1 3 CAL. Corn'. CODE § 501(g).
14 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2403(c).
15 12 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 5442 (Perm. ed. 1932).
16 See cases collected in 61 A.L.R.2d 1318 (1958), 65 A.L.R. 1165 (1930), 138
A.L.R. 647 (1942).
17 CAL. CoRnp. CODE § 501(g): The bylaws of a corporation may make provisions not
in conflict with law or its articles for special qualifications of persons who may be share-
holders, and reasonable restrictions upon the right to transfer or hypothecate shares.
18 Oppenheim, The Close Corporation in California-Necessity of Separate Treat-
ment, 12 HAST. L.J. 227 (1961); however, see 11 OPs. CAL. ATrY. CEN. 83 (1948),
where it is advanced that they should be approved.
19 Vannucci v. Pedrini, 217 Cal. 138, 17 P.2d 706 (1932); Thomsen v. Yankee Mar-
iner Corp., 106 Cal. App. 2d 454, 235 P.2d 234 (1951).
20 51 Cal. App. 2d 69, 124 P.2d 143 (1942).
21 Oppenheim, The Close Corporation in California-Necessity of Separate Treat-
ment, 12 HAST. L.J. 227, 235 (1961).
22 68 Beacon St. v. Sohier, 289 Mass. 354, 194 N.E. 303 (1935); 1165 5th Ave. Corp.
v. Alger, 288 N.Y. 67, 41 N.E.2d 461, 141 A.L.R. 1157 (1942); Penthouse Properties v.
1158 5th Ave., 256 App. Div. 685, 11 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1939); Weisner v. 791 Park Ave.
Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 426, 190 N.Y.S.2d 70, 160 N.E.2d 720 (1959).
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assign the lease or sublet the premises without the written consent of
the board of directors or a substantial majority of the stockholders of
the corporation. The covenant is made binding on the executors and
administrators as well as on assignees of the lessee. Related provisions
usually specify that assignments may be made only to persons holding
the required number of shares of stock, and that the assignee must
furnish the board of directors with a written statement assuming all
the covenants in the lease and all of his assignor's obligations to the
corporation.2 3
Little needs to be said concerning the validity of covenants in a
lease requiring that the lessee first obtain the consent of the lessor
before assigning the lease or subletting the leased premises. Such pro-
visions have been held fair and reasonable and are not in violation of
the Rule Against Restraints on Alienation.24 This is true even though
the lessor may arbitrarily withhold his consent, regardless of the pro-
posed assignee's qualifications,2 5 and impose whatever conditions he
desires for his approval.28
The remedy available to the lessor for a breach of this covenant is
the privilege to declare a forfeiture.27 The California Code of Civil
Procedure28 specifically provides for restitution of the leased premises
to the lessor on three days notice to the person then in possession. The
lessor, however, does not have the privilege of declaring the assign-
ment void.2 9
It may be argued that by the combination of the proprietary lease
with the ownership of the appurtenant stock, the tenant-owner has
more than a leasehold interest in the demised premises; 30 and there-
fore, the restriction on the right to alienate is repugnant to the interest
created,3 1 and therefore void. This argument would have some merit
if it were designed to preserve the cooperative scheme rather than to
destroy it.82 Since it is not, there would seem to be no reason why the
courts should deviate in this case from the basic legal principles of
landlord and tenant. Cases in point clearly have not.83
23 8 Am. Jun. LEGAL FoaMS ANNoTATED § 8.378.
24 KCendis v. Cohn, 90 Cal. App. 41, 265 Pac. 844 (1928).
25 Richard v. Degen & Brody, Inc., 181 Cal. App. 2d 289, 5 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1960).
26 Ibid.
27R andol v. Tatum, 98 Cal. 390, 33 Pac. 433 (1893).
28 CAL. CODE CrV. Pnoc. § 1161(4).
29 Randol v. Tatum, 98 Cal. 390, 33 Pac. 433 (1893).
3O Accord, In re Estate of Pitts, 218 Cal. 184, 22 P.2d 694 (1933).
31 CAL. Crv. CODE § 711.
32 PACHEL, COoPTnnRxvEs 49 (3d ed. 1956).
2368 Beacon St. v. Sohier, 289 Mass. 354, 194 N.E. 303 (1935); Weisner v. 791
Park Ave. Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 426, 190 N.Y.S.2d 70, 160 N.E.2d 720 (1959); 1165 5th Ave.
Corp. v. Alger, 288 N.Y. 67, 41 N.E.2d 461, 141 A.L.R. 1157 (1942); Penthouse Proper-
ties v. 1158 5th Ave., 256 App. Div. 685, 11 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1939).
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Restraining Alienation in the Fee Forms
A somewhat more difficult problem is encountered when similar
restraints are sought to be imposed in the condominium or fee-form
cooperative apartment. As a general rule, restraints on the alienation
of a fee simple interest are void.34 This rule applies regardless of the
form used to impose the restraint,35 and cannot be circumvented by
agreement outside the granting instrument.36 A provision which re-
quires that the grantee obtain the consent of the grantor or a third
person before alienating his interest is well within this rule.3 7 It would
seem then that any attempt to restrain the alienation of a tenant-
owner's interest under the fee form would be futile. This being the
state of the law at the present time, what arguments could be advanced
for change with respect to the cooperative apartment scheme either
through legislative modification or enlightened judicial decision ex-
cepting the tenant-owner's interest from the general rule?
First of all, the repugnancy test, although given lip service in the
statutes and judicial decisions, is not the real criteria for invalidity.
The true reason for this rule is to prevent the withdrawal of property
from commerce which, in most cases, is contrary to public policy.38
With public policy the true criteria, it would seem then the question to
consider should be: Does the public benefit more in allowing the co-
operative apartment scheme to be preserved by the imposition of this
restraint or in having the tenant-owners' interest alienable without first
obtaining the approval of his co-tenant-owners? 39 The public advan-
tages of the cooperative apartment and the need for controlling trans-
fers of interest created therein has been demonstrated. As a practical
matter, the only real danger in validating this restraint would be the
possibility of an arbitrary withholding of approval. This danger is
minimized by requiring only a simple majority for approval and by the
realization that an arbitrary withholding by a tenant-owner is apt to
be responded to in kind when he desires to sell his interest.
In a Maryland case, Northwest Real Estate Co. v. Serio,40 the court
was confronted with a provision in the deeds to all the lots in a new
subdivision which provided that no owner would have the right to sell
34 CAL. CIV. CODE § 711: A condition restraining alienation, if repugnant to the in-
terest created, is void.
3 Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Garrott, 42 Cal. App. 152, 183 Pac. 470 (1919).
3 Wharton v. Mollinet, 103 Cal. App. 2d 710, 229 P.2d 861 (1951).
3 Prey v. Stanley, 110 Cal. 423, 44 Pac. 908 (1895) (by contract); Murray v.
Green, 64 Cal. 363, 28 Pac. 118 (1883); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 406, comment h
(1944).
38 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 592 (2d ed. 1920).
39 SIMES & SMITH, FuTuRE INTERESTS § 1168 (1956) where it is stated that the test
should be: ". . balancing the beneficial character of the purposes of the restraint as
against the extent to which the alienability would be hindered if the provision in question
were held valid."
40 156 Md. 229, 144 AUt. 245 (1929).
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or convey without the consent of the grantor for four years. The pro-
vision expressly recited that the purpose of the restraint was to pre-
serve the high class of the neighborhood. The majority of the court
held that the restraint was void. Chief Justice Bond in a vigorous dis-
sent argued that the restraint was necessary to insure the prospective
purchasers and the developer that the value of their property would
not be depreciated by an invasion of undesirable neighbors, and that
modem urban development, a distinct public benefit, requires such
assurances. He then went on to say:41
The view I venture to urge, then, is that the general prohibition of
restraints on alienation should be considered as having some relation
to the facts to be dealt with, not that the law should be changed,
but that there should be a recognition of change in the conditions
with which the law has to deal, and a discriminating pursuit among
modern conditions of the one object always sought by the law-the
protection of public interest.
One exception to the rule against restraints on alienation generally
recognized by the courts and legislature is the control of the transfer
of an interest in a partnership. This exception is based on the proposi-
tion that a business man should be permitted to select his associates
in such an organization.42 Such a privilege is necessary to preserve
the harmony of operation and thus the very existence of the firm. Is
it not equally as important for a person to have the privilege of select-
ing the persons with whom he is going to have to share his home?
There seems to be some hope that the courts will recognize the co-
operative apartment scheme as an exception to the general doctrine
against restraints on alienation.4"
Restrictions on the Use of Cooperative Apartment Property
Equally important to the maintenance of the cooperative apart-
ment scheme as the control of who are to be its members is the control
of the tenants' activities while occupying that status. The economic
and social interdependence of the tenant-owners demands cooperation
on all levels of cooperative life if a tolerable living situation is to be
maintained. Each tenant-owner is required to give up some of the
freedoms he would otherwise enjoy if he were living in a private dwell-
ing and likewise is privileged to demand the same sacrifices of his
co-tenant-owners with respect to his rights.
By analogy, the cooperative apartment is really a community with-
in a community, governed, like our municipalities, by rules and regu-
lations for the benefit of the whole. Whereas the use of lands within
41Id. at 239, 144 AtI. at 248 (dissent).
4 2 Smms & SmrrH, FvrtaE INTnST § 1166 (1956).
-3 Id. § 1168: "One may well anticipate that, in the face of new purposes which are
definitely in accord with good public policy, the courts may make new exceptions to the
old doctrines with respect to direct restraints."
COMMENTSFeb., 19621
a city is controlled by zoning ordinances, the use of the apartments
within the cooperative project is controlled by restrictive covenants.
The use of the common facilities in the project is controlled on the
same theory that the use of city streets and parks is regulated. In both
situations compliance with the regulations is the price to be paid to
live in and enjoy the benefits of the particular organization.
Restrictions in the Cooperative Apartment
Restrictions on the use of cooperative apartment property is pro-
vided for by covenants made by the tenant-owner in the instrument
which creates his interest. Concerning the use of his apartment, he
generally covenants: to use the apartment only for the purpose of a
private dwelling, to keep the interior of the apartment in good repair,
and not to make structural alterations therein without the consent of
the governing body. It is also generally provided that the governing
body may from time to time make "house rules" which the tenant-
owner covenants to observe. 44 Such rules contain provisions regulating
the use of the common facilities, the times for conducting noisy activ-
ities, the keeping of pets, and any other provisions necessary to pro-
mote the harmony of the group.45
Enforcement of the Restrictions
It may be safely stated that all the tenant-owners are bound by the
common restrictions. If the tenant-owner is the original covenantor
or an assignee of an original covenantor who has assumed the cove-
nants as a condition to the approval of the assignment,4 6 he is bound
on the theory of privity of contract in most jurisdictions. In the con-
dominium where such approval may not be required,47 the covenants
should nevertheless bind assignees of the tenant-owner's interest.
Borgwardt argues that the burden of these covenants can be made to
run with the land as covenants between adjoining landowners. 48 If no
legal remedy is available, the covenant will be enforceable in equity.4 9
The two requirements for such enforcement are: first, the assignee or
grantee of the covenantor takes the transfer with knowledge of the re-
strictions and; second, the circumstances are such that it would be
inequitable to permit him to avoid the restriction."0
The corporation or trustee, occupying the position of covenantee,
may enforce the provisions on that basis. The grantor of a fee who is
4 For a recommended lease containing these covenants see: lA MODERN LEGAL
FonMs § 2194 (1953).
45 Id. § 2195 for an example of house rules.
4 G See the discussion of transfers of interest, supra.
47 In the section on restraints on alienation, supra, it is argued that such a require-
inent should be valid but that it is not under existing law in California.
48 Borgwardt, The Condominium, 36 CAL. S. BAR J. 603 n.5 (1961).
49 Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 101 P.2d 490 (1940); 4 PO.EROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1295 (5th ed. 1941).
50 Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 101 P.2d 490 (1940).
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the original party to the covenant in the condominium may enforce
the restriction only so long as he owns part of the property benefited
by the restriction. 1 In most cases where the fee form is used, the de-
veloper does not retain any interest in the project once all the apart-
ments are disposed of and hence he has no basis to enforce any of the
restrictive covenants in the deed.
What if the covenantee is unwilling, or unable as in the case of the
condominium, to enforce the covenants? Is the tenant-owner to go
remediless in the face of violations by his co-tenant-owners? Unfortu-
nately there are no cases directly in point with which to dispose of this
problem. One probable reason for this lack is the fact that a board of
directors in the corporate form which is unwilling to enforce the re-
strictions will probably soon be replaced by a more diligent group
since the injured tenant-owners are also voting stockholders. Also,
problems which arise under the restrictions will usually be settled by
social pressure within the group without the need of litigation. As for
the condominium, its rarity accounts for the lack of litigation concern-
ing it in any regard.
If the need does arise, however, on what basis may it be argued
that the tenant-owner may enforce the restrictive covenants made by
his co-tenant-owners with the corporation, trustee or grantor? There
is no legal privity between the tenant-owners based on the fact that
they are tenants in the same building or that they acquired their in-
terest from the ame landlord or grantee. 52 Consequently, the reme-
dies for breach of covenant are excluded and resort will have to be
made to principles of equity.
It may well be argued that the restrictive covenants create equi-
table servitudes on all the apartments in favor of the entire project
and every other apartment. The basic illustration of the doctrine of
equitable servitudes is concerned with the restrictions placed on all
the lots of a given tract of land.5 3 It would seem to make little differ-
ence in the theory of this doctrine whether the "lots" were spread out
horizontally or stacked vertically in a single building. An examination
of the basic requirements for the creation of equitable servitudes and
the enforcement of covenants as such gives some strength to the argu-
ment that the restrictions in the cooperative apartment scheme can be
enforced under this doctrine.
First, the covenant must be made expressly for the benefit of the
other lots in the tract.54 Second, the dominant or benefiting tenement
51 Kent v. Koch, 166 Cal. App. 2d 579, 333 P.2d 411 (1958).
52 McDowell v. Hyman, 117 Cal. 67, 48 Pac. 984 (1897).
53 4 Ponmoy, EQurrY JuwsR UDENCE § 1295 (5th ed. 1941); 14 CAL. Jur. 2d Cov-
enants § 102 (1954).
54 14 CAL. Jul. 2d Covenants § 103 (1954) citing: Alderson v. Cutting, 163 Cal.
503, 126 Pac. 157 (1912); Fontana Farms Co. v. Criss, 77 Cal. App. 2d 190, 174 P.2d
890 (1946).
Feb., 1962,] COMMENTS
must be clearly specified. 55 Third, the restrictions must be uniform as
to each lot so as to show that the plan is common to all lot owners.5 6
And finally, it must be shown that the restrictions are incident to the
ownership of a lot in the tract.5 7
Applying these rules to cooperative apartment regulations, indi-
cates that they should be enforceable by the tenant-owners on the
same theory that like regulations are enforceable by lot owners in a
specific tract of land. Clearly the regulations are adopted for the bene-
fit of each and every tenant-owner. The entire project, formed on the
idea of cooperation, is the beneficiary of uniform compliance with
these restrictions. The rules are made for the entire group to promote
the very purpose of the project-the maintenance of a home for the
tenant-owners. The rules by their very nature are incident to the priv-
ilege of living in the cooperative plan.
It would seem then that a court exercising the powers of equity
would be willing to give relief to a tenant-owner by enforcing the re-
strictive covenants made by his co-tenant owners for his benefit. The
relationship between tenant-owners, there being no privity between
them, would not give rise to an action at law; indeed by the very nature
of the cooperative-system it would seem inequitable to treat them as
strangers and force them to seek their relief on that basis.
Conclusion
The cooperative apartment scheme is a unique method of real
estate development in which the benefits and economies of apartment
living are combined with the security of home ownership. It is one
solution to the increasing need for housing in our metropolitan areas
where the available residential property is at a premium.
The legal problems involved in the cooperative apartment are also
unique in that the interests created in the project and the legal rela-
tionship between the parties are not readily classifiable by the law of
landlord & tenant, partnerships, corporations, property, trusts, or any
other standard niche of our legal system. The courts, then, will be
required anew to determine the property interests and the legal rela-
tionships which are applicable to the particular controversy at hand.
The courts, in dealing with the problems of cooperative apartment
development, should keep in mind the important benefits the public
derives from these projects. The law should be applied in a manner
consistent with the protection of the public interest. Recognizing the
needs of the cooperative system and applying the law consistent with
their fulfillment, is the only way that this goal can be achieved.
55 Id. § 104, citing Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 Pac. 945 (1919); Martin
v. Ray, 76 Cal. App. 2d 471, 173 P.2d 573 (1946).
56 Id. § 105, citing Moe v. Gier, 116 Cal. App. 403, 2 P.2d 852 (1931).
57 Id. § 106, citing Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 Pac. 945 (1919).
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